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Privateering has often been portrayed as a particularly risky business. Some historians have posited 
that it was undertaken only by disreputable merchants, whilst others have argued that profits would 
not have been made if systems of control had been absent, and that merchants were in fact rational 
when they invested in privateering. So far, however, no-one has sought to gauge or measure the 
perceived riskiness of privateering by the merchants themselves, and the rationality of those who 
participated in it. Using the Seven Years War as a case study, this article seeks to measure the extent 
to which Liverpool merchants perceived privateering to be a risky proposition. As a measurement of 
the perception of risk, the network size in Liverpool’s privateering voyages is compared to those in 
the Liverpool slave trade, another trade known to be risky, but one in which Liverpool merchants 
excelled. In the case of ‘private men of war’, the network size was usually at least as large as those in 
the slave trade, and often larger. Therefore, the analysis presented here demonstrates that 
Liverpool’s merchants did perceive privateering—especially its ‘deep water’ variant—as a 
particularly risky activity during the Seven Years War. By their use of their networks, however, 
through which they both spread risk, and brought in wider financial and human capital, they were 
essentially rational in their pursuit of this particular business. 
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Privateering, ‘the setting out of privately owned vessels licensed by the State to appropriate the 
seaborne property of enemy subjects in wartime’, has been an important part of maritime war since 
at least the Elizabethan period.1 Indeed, whilst its cousin piracy had been mostly eradicated by the 
1730s, the use of privateering for personal profit with benefits to the state was becoming more 
valued.2 Some historians, such as Larry Neal, have argued that the role played by privateers was 
minimal. But it is now more widely accepted that although contemporaries complained about the 
abuses and problems associated with privateering, it benefitted the state and individuals both 
militarily and economically.3 Nevertheless, there are some who argue that privateering was 
undertaken by disreputable merchants who took captures by chance, competed with the Navy for 
                                                 
1 David J. Starkey, ‘The Economic and Military Significance of British Privateering, 1702-83’, Journal of 
Transport History, 9 (1988), 50; Kenneth R. Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering: English Privateering During the 
Spanish War, 1685-1603 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), 6. 
2 David J. Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise in the Eighteenth Century (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 
1990), 19, 13. 
3 Larry Neal, ‘Interpreting Power and Profit in Economic History: A Case Study of the Seven Years’ War’, Journal 
of Economic History, 37 (Mar 1977), 20-35; Starkey, ‘Economic and Military Significance’.  
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men, and were a slender cover for piracy. N. A. M. Rodger, for example, is derogatory about 
privateers, stating that only ‘the most reckless gambler’ would join such a vessel.4 Certainly the risks 
were huge (and real for the seamen), but there is no doubt that for some merchants, taking risks 
(perceived or otherwise), were worth the financial reward. For example, some were involved in 
smuggling, thinking the potential windfall profits worth the risk. Occasionally, these were young men 
new to trade, but working outside the law required capital, and good, trustworthy networks.5 David 
Starkey agrees there was a risk in privateering, both financial for the merchants, and physical for the 
sailors. However, in comparison to Rodger, he argues that without good discipline, the privateers 
were unlikely to achieve their aims, and that there is evidence to suggest that the systems of control 
were ‘sufficient to curb the worst excesses’.6 These included bail bonds and guarantees for good 
conduct.7 Indeed, Jeremy Black adds that privateering offered an opportunity to merchants and 
sailors when normal trade was suppressed, providing commerce and employment to those who took 
‘independent initiatives’.8  
There is no doubt that privateering was perceived as a risky enterprise, and it was often 
linked with the wider eighteenth-century discourse concerning gambling; this was increasingly 
becoming associated with fraud and criminality amongst the lower orders, and solitary corruption 
amongst the elite. In wartime, however, privateering could be seen as a patriotic behaviour, along 
with investing in East India Company stock or Government consuls, including by ‘ladies’.9 Indeed, the 
Earl of Derby praised the Liverpool merchants for their ‘spirit of enterprise which had stimulated 
them to exert themselves so much against the enemy’.10 To some extent of course, taking the 
                                                 
4 N. A. M. Rodger, The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (London: Fontana Press, 1988), 185. 
5 T. C. Barker, ‘Smuggling in the Eighteenth Century: The Evidence of the Scottish Tobacco Trade’, Virginia 
Magazine of History and Biography, 62 (Oct 1954), 387-99; G. V. Scammell, ‘“A very Profitable and 
Advantageous Trade”: British Smuggling in the Iberian Americas’, Itinerario, 24 (Nov 2000), 135-72. 
6 Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise; David J. Starkey, ‘The Origins and Regulation of Eighteenth-Century 
British Privateering’, in C. R. Pennell (ed.), Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader (New York: New York University 
Press, 2001), 76. 
7 These were set at £3,000 for a crew of over 150, and at £1,500 for a smaller crew. Two guarantors were 
required. Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise, 24. 
8 Jeremy Black, Trade, Empire and British Foreign Policy, 1689-1815 (London & New York: Routledge, 2007), 12, 
34. 
9 Donna T. Andrew, Aristocratic Vice: The Attack on Duelling, Suicide, Adultery and Gambling in Eighteenth-
Century England (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2013), 180-95; David Hancock, ‘“Domestic 
Bubbling”: Eighteenth-Century London Merchants and Individual Investment in the Funds’, Economic History 
Review, 67 (1994), 679-702; Huw Bowen, Elites, Enterprise and the Making of the British Overseas Empire 
1688-1775 (London and Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1996), 79-100. Only one woman appears to have been 
an investor in the Liverpool privateers, Hannah Hunter, in the Frederick in 1759. TNA, HCA 26/11, f.20. 
10 Cited in David J. Starkey, ‘A Restless Spirit: British Privateering Enterprise, 1738-1815’, in David J. Starkey, 
E.S. Van Eyck van Heslinga and J.A. Moor (eds.), Pirates and Privateers: New Perspectives on the War on Trade 
in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997), 126-7. 
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calculated risk of privateering was different from gambling, and Starkey acknowledges that those 
who made extravagant gains were probably the fortunate few. He also argues, however, that 
enough privateers made enough profit to demonstrate not only the viability of commerce raiding 
but its ‘essential rationality’.11 So far, however, no one has sought to gauge or measure the 
perceived riskiness of privateering by the merchants themselves, and the rationality of those who 
engaged in it. 
This article seeks to measure the extent to which Liverpool merchants perceived 
privateering to be a risky proposition during the Seven Years War, and to consider whether they 
were rational in their pursuit of it. As a measurement of the perception of risk, the network size in 
Liverpool’s privateering voyages is compared to those in the Liverpool slave trade, another trade 
known to be risky, but in which the Liverpool merchants excelled.12 It also compares those trading 
vessels which held privateering licences simply to protect themselves on normal commercial voyages 
(known as ‘letter of marque’ vessels), with ‘private men of war’, which were more heavily manned 
and armed to engage in more aggressive and therefore more risky enterprises. Liverpool during the 
Seven Years War provides a good case study because it was then that privateering became less 
centralised and moved to the outports, and increasingly, to Liverpool, where capital and labour were 
available in abundance.13 Liverpool had also just taken over as the leading port in the slave trade, 
making this period a good benchmark for the purposes of comparison.14 
 
Methodology 
All of the declarations made by those applying for privateering licences in respect of Liverpool 
vessels during the Seven Years War were collated. This comprised the declarations made in London 
(HCA 26) by the merchants’ representatives, and those made in Liverpool (HCA 25), often by the 
ships’ captains themselves.15 There were occasionally duplicate licences. This occurred when there 
was a change in captain or ownership and a new license was required rather than representing a 
                                                 
11 Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise, 281. 
12 Sheryllynne Haggerty, ‘Risk and Risk Management in the Liverpool Slave Trade’, Business History, 51:6 (Nov 
2009), 817-34. 
13 Starkey, ‘Restless Spirit’, 129. 
14 D. Lamb, ‘Volume and Tonnage of the Liverpool Slave Trade 1772-1807’, in Roger Anstey and Paul E. Hair 
(eds.), Liverpool, the African Slave Trade, and Abolition (Liverpool: Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, 
Occasional Series, Vol. 2, 1976), 91.  
15 Those seeking privateering licences, which empowered their vessels and crews to take cargoes and vessels 
belonging to foreign citizens according to prize law, were obliged to make a declaration as to the name, 
characteristics, officers and owners of their vessel. The declarations for the 1689-1815 period are house in 
London, Kew, The National Archives (hereafter TNA), HCA 25, 26. 
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separate journey.16 To avoid repetition these have been omitted. However, where there was a 
second declaration made after the declared length of the first voyage, this has been counted as a 
second voyage, and in a few cases, a third voyage occurred and is also included as such.17 This article 
therefore refers to voyages, as opposed to vessels, and a total of 295 individual voyages were 
identified.18 The declarations list the crew, as well as the number of sails, small arms, and cordage 
amongst other accoutrements, but unfortunately not the destination, as this was not required by 
the Admiralty at this time. They also list the ‘setters out’, the investors in the enterprise. On a few 
occasions, the declarations list only one merchant even when they were not the ‘sole owner’, noting 
them as the ‘principal setter out’, or simply stating ‘and others’. This tended to occur more with the 
declarations made in Liverpool, where the investors in any voyage were probably well known, 
and/or bureaucracy was lax. However, enough full lists were made to provide a good estimation of 
the number of total ‘setters out’ (hereafter investors) and a sense of the size of the average 
networks (if slightly under recorded). 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: the first section analyses the wider 
patterns of commission holding for all of Liverpool’s licenced vessels during the Seven Years War. 
The second looks in more detail at those involved in the more aggressive ‘private men of war’ and 
the main merchants involved. The third section compares the networks of seven case study 
investors in private men of war, with their investments in the slave trade. This facilitates a 
consideration of the perceived degree of riskiness in privateering and an assessment of the 
merchants’ rationality in their pursuit of it. The fourth and final section concludes that engaging in 
private men of war was indeed perceived as a risky enterprise by Liverpool merchants, and as risky, 
and sometimes more so, than the slave trade. However, they were rational in their pursuit of it by 
counter-acting that risk with larger networks which spread the risk—albeit the financial rewards as 
well.  
 
Liverpool privateering during the Seven Years War 
As noted above, privateering became less centralised during the eighteenth century. Table 1 
highlights the move towards Liverpool over the eighteenth century. It is clear that by the Seven 
Years War Liverpool accounted for a significant proportion of the British privateering force. 
 
                                                 
16 Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise, 287. 
17 These have been distinguished in the figures below by adding the month or year onto the label. Where two 
vessels had the same name they are distinguished by adding the tonnage to the label.  
18 Out of a total of 306 Commissions. 
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* Percentages refer to total Commissions, not voyages. 
Source: Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise, pp.89, 119, 165, 200-201. 
 
Liverpool’s trading community was known as a relatively open commercial group, in which 
newcomers could potentially make their fortune.19 This might have been because there were no 
guilds in the town, which may also partly account for Liverpool’s reputation for being shrewd in 
business practices. It has been argued, for example, that Liverpool merchants were able to take 
advantage of locational factors such as transport links for manufacturing goods, were able to gain 
longer credit periods than their rivals for those goods, and could therefore keep seamen’s wages 
low.20 Liverpool had recently become the leading outport in the slave trade,21 mainly because its 
merchants were particularly good at adapting to African credit customs such as pawnship, and in 
                                                 
19 Robin Pearson and David Richardson, ‘Social capital, institutional innovation and Atlantic trade before 1800’, 
Business History, 50 (November 2008), 765–80.  
20 Kenneth Morgan, ‘Liverpool’s Dominance in the British Slave Trade, 1740-1807’, in David Richardson, 
Suzanne Schwarz and Anthony Tibbles (eds.), Liverpool and Transatlantic Slavery (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 2007), 14-42.  
21 During the 1750s, its merchants sent out 49 vessels to West Africa, compared to twenty from Bristol and 
thirteen from London. Lamb, ‘Volume and Tonnage of the Liverpool Slave Trade’, 91.  
 Commissions for 
Liverpool Vessels 
% of National Total  
War of Spanish Succession  
(1702-12)  
39 2.4 
War of Jenkins’ Ear 
(1739-48)  
114 7.2 
Seven Years’ War  
(1756-63)  
306 14.5 
American War of Independence (1776-83)  1384 18.8 
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finding new places for trade on the African coast.22 They were also amongst the first to adopt the 
guarantee system, which ensured payments from West India planters.23 There is no doubting they 
also used shrewd business practices in privateering. Seaman working in private men of war received 
no wages – just their (small) share of any prizes, and even those working in ‘letter of marque’ vessels 
were not rewarded with increased wages for the higher risks of working in wartime. Financial risk 
was also shared between the various investors, and many charges, such as benefits to dependents of 
those killed in action, were paid before the prize money was distributed.24 No doubt their general 
acuity in business helped Liverpool merchants in privateering too. 
Figure 1 shows the networks of all the Liverpool merchants who invested in licenced vessels 
during the Seven Years War, when commissions were issued from June 1756 to the end of 1762.25 It 
is clear that there was a central, dense network, with many outliers—groups of investors in small 
and often isolated networks. Many of the outliers were in investor groups of one, two or three, 
which was in fact the normal range of merchants for peacetime commercial ventures. The dense 
centre however, shows that there were many inter-connections between merchants, often investing 
in the same vessels together in a variety of network groups, although some persistently invested 
together, as will be shown below. There were clearly quite a few actors who were at the centre of 
these networks and were well connected.  
 
Figure 1: All investors in privateering vessels, 1756-1762.26 
                                                 
22 Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson, ‘Trust, Pawnship and Atlantic History: The Institutional Foundations of 
the Old Calabar Slave Trade’, American Historical Review, 104 (1999), 333-55; Paul E. Lovejoy and David 
Richardson, ‘“This Horrid Hole”: Royal Authority, Commerce and Credit and Bonny, 1690-1840’, Journal of 
African History, 45 (2004), 363-9. 
23 Kenneth Morgan, ‘Remittance Procedures in the Eighteenth-Century British Slave Trade’, Business History 
Review, 79 (2005), 715-49. 
24 Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise, 66, 72. 
25 Spain joined the war in January 1762. Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise, 162. 
26 The actors at the centre of all the figures presented here are the best connected, and those on the edge, the 




Red denotes a vessel. 
Vessel with year annotated = same vessel different voyage. 
Vessel with tonnage annotated = vessel of same name but different investor group. 
Source: TNA, HCA 25 and HCA 26, 1756-1763. 
 
In 1759, the Privateers Act was enacted to placate the Dutch and other neutrals, who complained of 
smaller predatory vessels attacking neutral vessels along the coast. These smaller vessels were 
supposed to be the ‘sacrificial lamb’.27 A ‘rule of thumb’ can be derived from the Act to calculate 
whether or not a vessel was acting as an aggressive privateering vessel. This rough measure is based 
on the manning to tonnage ratio. Those vessels with a manning to tonnage ratio of less than 1:2.5 
can be considered ‘letters of marque’, engaged in a normal trading voyage, but holding a licence in 
order to profit from any successful defensive action. Most captains and owners obtained a 
commission as a default position, because if a merchantman took a vessel on defending itself 
without a licence, the goods became the property of the state.28 Those with a higher manning to 
tonnage ratio of more than 1:2.5 can be cast as ‘private men of war’, which embarked on cruises 
                                                 
27 Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise, 163. 
28 Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise, 22. 
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with the intention of taking prizes rather than carrying cargoes. Those with this higher manning to 
tonnage ratio, but of less than 100 tons have been termed ‘channel’ privateers, as they tended to 
operate in the English Channel, attacking neutral and enemy vessels off the French coast. The larger 
heavily-manned private men of war ventured into the Atlantic or the Caribbean, and have been 
described as ‘deep water’ vessels that sought to capture large, valuable vessels returning from the 
French Caribbean and Spanish mainland colonies. Both were cruise and attack voyages, aggressively 
seeking to board and take vessels, with trading a secondary consideration, if at all.  The Fame cruised 
in the Caribbean, for example, and took French and Dutch prizes into Kingston, Jamaica, whilst the 
Manderin cruised the English Channel.29 The ‘patriotic intentions’ of these vessels were advertised in 
the local newspapers; in 1756, the Anson was advertised as ‘ready to cruise against the French’, and 
the Grand Buck was ‘ready to sail against the French’.30 The 1759 Act, in trying to curb the activities 
of ‘channel’ privateers, provided a means to categorise all the privateering vessels, and this article 
follows Starkey, who devised these categorisations.  
Of the 295 voyages recorded for Liverpool, 272, 92.2. per cent of the total, were undertaken 
by ‘letter of marque’ vessels engaged in non-aggressive voyages. Therefore, most of the networks in 
Figure 1 represent trading vessels which held a privateering licence in case the crew needed to 
defend themselves. Whilst the average network size for all privateering voyages from Liverpool was 
2.55, that for ‘letters of marque’ was only 2.2, about the same size as partnerships in normal trading 
conditions. Clearly, most merchants did not increase their network size in order to spread risk in a 
time of war, but instead relied on existing networks of trust. This is not as surprising as it seems, as 
many merchants entrenched their networks in periods of crisis.31 They would, of course, have paid 
more for insurance, especially if they sailed without a convoy; ‘the premium being proportional to 
the distance, danger of seas, enemies etc.’.32 However, as Adrian Leonard has argued, ‘marine 
insurance helped Britain to transform violence at sea into a national strength’.33 Liverpool merchants 
therefore overwhelmingly concentrated on ‘letter of marque’ vessels, and these merchants were 
probably risk-averse on the whole.  
                                                 
29 Gomer Williams, History of the Liverpool Privateers and Letters of Marque, With An Account of the Liverpool 
Slave Trade, 1744-1812 [1897] (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2004), 103, 96. 
30 Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser and Mercantile Register, 26 November 1756 and 10 December 1756. Both 
are mentioned below. 
31 See Sheryllynne Haggerty, ‘Merely for Money’? Business Culture in the British Atlantic, 1750-1815 (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2012), chapter six.  
32 Cited in Hugh Cockerell and Anthony Lewis, The British Insurance Business 1547-1970: An Introduction and 
Guide to Historical Records in the UK (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1976), 4. 
33 A. B. Leonard, ‘Underwriting Marine Warfare: Insurance and Conflict in the Eighteenth Century’, 




‘Private men of war’ 
With regard to ‘private men of war’ activity, a very different pattern emerges. Of the total 295 
licences issued in respect of Liverpool vessels, only 23 voyages, or 7.8 per cent were cruise and 
attack voyages.34  Of these, five vessels were under 99 tons—and can be classed as ‘channel 
privateers’. The remaining fifteen vessels are deemed to have been ‘deep water’ vessels. Arguably, 
the merchants involved in these voyages were prepared to take more risk. Despite this, many sailed 
uninsured. This was because even when they were insured, the cover was often inadequate and the 
premium very high.35 Figure 2 shows the investment networks of ‘private men of war’ (both 
‘channel’ and ‘deep water’) in Liverpool, 1756-62. 
 
Figure 2: Network of Investors in Private Men of War, 1756-1762 
 
Source: TNA, HCA 25 and HCA 26, 1756-1763. 
 
                                                 
34 The 23 voyages are listed at Appendix A. The Anson, King of Prussia and the Mercury undertook two voyages 
each.  




In all, 61 different Liverpool merchants were involved in these riskier voyages at least once. This was 
quite a sizeable part (27.85 per cent) of the port’s merchants, which numbered 219 by 1766.36 The 
mean investor network size for all ‘private men of war’ was 4.09.37 However, it is clear that two 
types of investment groups were at play. There were several small investment groups, including 
three merchants who invested as ‘sole setters out’: Richard Savage, George Campbell and Thomas 
Parke. John Hulton & Co. is an anomaly, because whilst he did invest in the Manderin (noted above) 
and the Revenge alone as John Hulton & Co., he was named in large investment groups for other 
vessels as John Hulton.38 It is interesting that both the Manderin and the Revenge were ‘channel’ 
privateers, whilst when investing in ‘deep water’ voyages he was involved in larger investment 
groups (see case studies below). The Antigua, with just two investors, David Agnew and Richard 
Gildart, was also a ‘channel’ vessel, as was George Campbell’s Blakeney Privateer.39 It is worth noting 
that these ‘channel’ voyages were all undertaken in 1756 and 1757, and certainly before the 1759 
Privateers Act. Indeed, the relative smallness of these vessels does not mean that their captains did 
not acquit themselves well. The Revenge, Captain Gyles, and the Manderin, Captain MacKaffee, 
cruised together along the French coast with apparent great success.40 Furthermore, the 90-ton 
Blakeney Privateer, Captain Day, combined forces with the 130 ton Hawke of Exeter to attack the 
Robuste, Le Juste, and two snows from St. Domingue sailing for La Rochelle off the Spanish coast. 
Captain Day returned to Liverpool with only 40 men left out of 70 to man his own vessel after 
manning his prizes, which were laden with lucrative cargoes of sugar, coffee and indigo.41 Despite 
their aggressive nature, ‘channel’ voyages had smaller, or sole, investor groups; the average network 
size was only 2.2. Even this is skewed by the inclusion of the Alice, of 80 tons, with seven investors. 
The Antigua was more representative with two investors, and the other three, only one. This may be 
because the cost of the vessel, equipment and crew would have been less for these smaller vessels, 
which embarked on relatively short cruises. This may have meant that ‘channel’ privateering voyages 
were perceived to have less financial risk. 
However, not all the smaller groups were ‘channel’ vessels. The Fame, Jenny, Fox, St. 
George, King of Prussia, Adventure and the Spy were all ‘deep water’ vessels with small investment 
                                                 
36 Sheryllynne Haggerty, The British-Atlantic Trading Community 1760-1810: Men, Women, and the Distribution 
of Goods (Leiden: Brill Press, 2006). We do not have precise merchant numbers for the 1750s. 
37 94 investors – including multiple investments by individual merchants/23 vessels. 
38 For this reason, John Hulton on his own, and as John Hulton & Co., have been left as different investors in 
the visualisations.  
39 TNA, HCA 26/6, f.32; HCA 26/8, f.152; HCA 26/5, ff.72, 75, 130. 
40 Williams, History of the Liverpool, 96-7. 
41 Williams, Liverpool Privateers, 90-2. 
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groups. These appear to be genuinely small investment groups, rather than under recording as more 
than one name is listed in each case. Many of those in involved in these smaller groups invested in 
only one or two privateering voyages. However, most ‘deep water’ cruises were financed by larger 
investment groups; they averaged 4.55 investors per voyage. Of those, only the investors of the 
Hawke (five investors, top left in Figure 2) were isolated. All the others were closely interconnected, 
particularly around some key actors: for example, John Hulton, Thomas Wakefield, Henry Hardwar 
and James Gildart. Indeed, John Hulton on his own, or acting as part of his merchant house, invested 
in the most ‘private man of war’ ventures, along with Henry Hardwar, at five apiece. John Hulton 
was also one of only four merchants who invested in both ‘channel’ and ‘deep water’ vessels. The 
others were Richard Trafford, George Campbell (& Co.), and James Appleton. Table 2 outlines 
Liverpool’s leading ‘private men of war’ investors, the number of voyages in which they were 
involved, and their mean network size. 
 
Table 2. Leading Merchants Involved in Private Men of War, 1756-1762* 






Hulton & Co., Hulton, John 5 Channel/Deep Water 4.6 
Hardwar, Henry 5 Deep Water 7.2 
Gildart, James 4 Deep Water 7.0 
Williamson, William 3 Deep Water 7.67 
Wakefield, Thomas 3 Deep Water 6.3 
Trafford, Richard 3 Channel/Deep Water 5.67 
Ogden, Edmund 3 Deep Water 6.67 
Campbell, George & Co./Campbell, George 3 Channel/Deep Water 4.67 
Wright, Fortunatus42 2 Deep Water 2.5 
Tarleton, John 2 Deep Water 7.0 
                                                 
42 Fortunatus Wright made his name during the War of Jenkins’ Ear – taking sixteen prizes 
allegedly worth £400,000 in the Fame. Williams, Liverpool Privateers, p.48. and for more on 
Wright see pp.32-78. 
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Rumbold, Thomas 2 Deep Water 6.0 
Paynter, David 2 Deep Water 2.5 
Parke & Co., Thomas 2 Deep Water 1.0 
Hyde & Co., Robert 2 Deep Water 6.0 
Hutchinson, William 2 Deep Water 9.0 
Earle, William (inc. Earle) 2 Deep Water 8.33 
Bartholomew, Sherlock 2 Deep Water 5.0 
Appleton, James 2 Channel/Deep Water 7.5 
Source: HCA 25, HCA 26 
• Those with two or more Private Man of War Voyages 
 
It is not clear whether experience drove merchants to larger networks or vice versa, but the average 
mean investor network size for ‘deep water’ vessels at 4.55 is much larger than that of the ‘channel’ 
privateers (2.2), and considerably higher than the mean network size of the whole ‘private man of 
war’ group at 4.09 (94 investments/23 vessels). Given that some investors are missing from the 
declarations, the mean average number of investors is probably higher than this. Indeed, many of 
the individual merchants’ network groups were much higher. Henry Hardwar’s was 7.2; James 
Gildart’s 7; James Appleton’s 7.5; William Williamson’s 7.67; John Tarleton’s 7, William Earle’s 8.33; 
and William Hutchinson’s 9; John Hulton’s average is relatively low due to his engagement in 
‘channel’ cruises. Clearly, ‘deep water’ ventures were perceived as much riskier than ‘channel’ 
ventures and normal commercial voyages.  
Significantly, the mean average network size for ‘deep water’ voyages was very similar to the 
average size of Liverpool’s slave trade networks at this time. Over the eighteenth century, 
Liverpool’s slave trading networks ranged from a mean low of one owner (at the beginning and end 
of the century), to a high of 5.5. The highest average means were to be found when Liverpool 
assumed a leading role in the slave trade down to the 1790s when these networks coalesced. During 
the Seven Years War, the mean average number of investors in slave trade voyages ranged from 
around five in 1756 to four in 1763. McDade argues that these relatively large investment groups 
spread risk in terms of numbers, but also by bringing together financial, human and social capital.43 
                                                 
43 Katie McDade, ‘Liverpool Slave Merchant Entrepreneurial Networks, 1725-1807’, Business History, 53 (2011), 
1103. McDade argues that the smaller networks at the end of the eighteenth century were a positive feature 
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The fact that the mean network size of ‘deep water’ vessels was larger than those of slave trade 
networks at the same time strongly suggests that the Liverpool merchants perceived that ‘deep 
water’ cruises were riskier than voyages in the slave trade. 
Indeed, many of those prepared to risk investing in ‘private men of war’ were also involved 
in the slave trade. Some 39 merchants, or 65 per cent of all investors in ‘private men of war’ were 
also involved to some extent in slave trading during the Seven Years War. This is not to say that all 
slave traders were involved in privateering. Table 3 lists those merchants who invested in two or 
more ‘private men of war’, and where they were also involved in the slave trade, the numbers of 
slave trade voyages in which they invested. It is clear that most of them were also involved in the 
slave trade, and some of them to a large extent. What is surprising is that Thomas Rumbold and 
William Earle did not invest more in ‘private men of war’ cruises, given their large-scale involvement 
in the slave trade. Perhaps their resources only stretched so far, or they perceived privateering as 
too risky to be involved further. Conversely, Fortunatus Wright, known for his privateering exploits, 
was not listed as a slave trader or slave captain during the Seven Years War.44 Others not involved in 
the slave trade included John Hulton, David Paynter and Robert Hyde & Co. It is possible that they 
did not have access to good networks in the slave trade, or that they could not commit enough 
capital for what could often be a three-year wait for returns, yet were prepared to take the 
occasional ‘patriotic’ investment in privateering.45 
 
Table 3. Leading Privateering Merchants’ Involvement in the Slave Trade 1756-1763* 
NAME NO OF  
MAN OF WAR 
VOYAGES 
NO OF  
SLAVE TRADE 
VOYAGES 
Hulton & Co., Hulton, John 5 0 
Hardwar, Henry 5 12 
Gildart, James 4 14 
                                                                                                                                                        
because the investors no longer needed the social capital, 1105. However, John Haggerty and Sheryllynne 
Haggerty argue that this was a feature of negative social capital, ‘The Life Cycle of a Metropolitan Business 
Network: Liverpool 1750-1810’, Explorations in Economic History, 48 (2011), 201-06. 
44 He was listed as a slave trade investor in the Success in 1749 (two owners), voyage 90280, and the Bee in 
1784 (five owners), voyage 80459. http://www.slavevoyages.org/voyage/search, accessed 6 March 2017. 
45 Morgan, ‘Remittance Procedures’. 
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Williamson, William 3 4 
Wakefield, Thomas 3 1 
Trafford, Richard 3 29 
Ogden, Edmund 3 2 
Campbell, George & Co./Campbell, George 3 11 
Wright, Fortunatus 2 0 
Tarleton, John 2 17 
Rumbold, Thomas 2 31 
Paynter, David 2 0 
Parke & Co., Thomas 2 3 
Hyde & Co., Robert 2 0 
Hutchinson, William 2 0 
Earle, William (inc. Earle) 2 20 
Bartholomew, Sherlock 2 3 
Appleton, James 2 3 
Source: HCA 25, HCA 26; http://www.slavevoyages.org/voyage/search, accessed 6 Mar 2017. 
*Those with two or more Private Man of War Voyages 
 
Case studies 
In order to develop the comparison with the slave trade networks further, it is worth looking at a 
few case studies. Table 4 shows the average network size in privateering and the slave trade of those 
merchants who invested in three or more ‘private men of war’. Only Richard Trafford and George 
Campbell were involved in (limited) ‘channel’ privateering, so the network averages mostly refer to 
‘deep water’ ventures. 
 









Hardwar, Henry 7.2 6.08 
Gildart, James 7.0 4.79 
Williamson, William 7.67 6.75 
Ogden, Edmund 6.67 15.0 
Wakefield, Thomas 6.3 7.00 
Trafford, Richard 5.67 6.65 
Campbell, George & Co./Campbell, George 4.67 2.55 
Source: HCA 25, HCA 26; http://www.slavevoyages.org/voyage/search, accessed 6 Mar 2017. 
• Those with two or more Private Man of War Voyages 
 
It is immediately noticeable that for those involved in the slave trade, the mean network size of the 
privateering voyages (mostly ‘deep water’) are all higher than the ‘private men of war’ mean 
network size of 4.09 and much higher than the mean for ‘channel’ privateers of 2.5. This is even the 
case for both Richard Trafford and George Campbell, who also invested in ‘channel’ privateers (with 
smaller network sizes). Henry Hardwar, James Gildart and William Williamson also had much higher 
than average network means in privateering. This suggests that these men considered privateering 
more risky than normal trade. However, they also spread that risk more widely, at the same time 
managing that risk by accessing more financial, human and social capital. It is also worth noting that 
Henry Hardwar, James Gildart, William Williamson and George Campbell had higher mean average 
network sizes in privateering than they did in the slave trade. It would appear that these men 
assessed ‘deep water’ privateering as more risky than the slave trade, and it is clear that both of 
these trades were considered more risky than normal commercial activities. Figures 3 and 4 
compare the networks of these merchants, as a group, in privateering and the slave trade 
respectively.  
 
Figure 3: ‘Private men of war’ networks of the case study actors, 1756-1762 
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Source: TNA, HCA 25, HCA 26. 
 
The case studies’ privateering networks are clearly interconnected, with no clear outliers. Henry 
Hardwar (centre right) and James Gildart (centre) are clearly important actors. This network is ego-
centric around the case studies, but these men clearly acted as ‘bridges’, important actors linking 
these networks together.46 William Earle and William Hutchinson (also the captain of his vessel) 
(both bottom right), were also clearly important despite not being case study actors. Figure 4 
highlights the case studies’ collective slave trade networks, which were vast and mostly densely 
connected. This makes the outliers all the more noteworthy. The investors in the Goree and the 
Surprize (both top right) are only linked via co-investors in the Wolfe, and there is a similar scenario 
for investors in the Defiance (centre left), Barbaodes Packet (top right) and the Jane (bottom left). 
There is a dense network (bottom right) around the Liberty and Prince Henry. If we look at these 
leading actors in more detail we can provide a more nuanced view of their risk management 
strategies. 
 
Figure 4: Slave trade networks of the case study actors, 1756-1762 
                                                 
46 R. Burt, ‘Structural Holes and Good Ideas’, American Journal of Sociology, 10 (2004), 349-99. 
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Source: http://www.slavevoyages.org/voyage/search, accessed 6 March 2017. 
 
Henry Hardwar (centre right Figure 3, centre left below the Defiance in Figure 4) was one of two 
merchants involved in five ‘private men of war’ cruises. His network mean for both ‘private men of 
war’ and the slave trade were both above the average, at 7.20 and 6.08 respectively. He invested in 
the Liverpoole, the venture with the highest number of investors, eleven, as well as in the Liverpool 
(1757 voyage, seven investors) the Auson (six investors), and the two Anson voyages (both also six 
investors). In the Liverpoole he invested with other leading privateer investors, James Gildart, 
William Williamson and John Hulton. Other investors included the captain, William Hutchinson, and 
William Earle (a leading slave trader).47 In the Liverpool, he again invested with James Gildart, 
William Earle and William Hatcheson [Hutchinson?]. The investors for the two Anson voyages were 
exactly the same; Hardwar teamed up with leading privateers George Campbell, William Williamson 
and Edmund Ogden, Robert Hyde & Co., Edmund Ogden and Thomas Rumbold (a leading slave 
trader). He therefore repeat invested with other leading privateers, as well as leading slave traders. 
The only outlier is the Auson investment group in which he teamed up with lesser-known John 
                                                 
47 The remaining investors were Francis Gildart, Messrs Douglas & Blackwood, Thomas Wycliffe, Edmund Lyon 
and Jonathon Robinson. 
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Bridge, Edward Fryer, Thomas Pinnwold[?] and James Sanders, although he still had one leading 
slave trader in the group, William Gregson. 
Hardwar’s investment in the slave trade followed a similar pattern. Although there was one 
voyage in which there were only three investors, the African, the remaining eleven ranged from four 
to ten, with the majority being six or seven.48 Not only were there leading slave traders in his 
investment groups—James Clemens, Peter Holme, Joseph Manesty and William Halliday—there 
were also several leading privateers as well: James Gildart, William Gregson, William Williamson and 
William Earle. Some slave trade voyages also had the same investment groups, such as the two King 
George voyages (both with Richard Jackson, John Bridge, Lawrence Spencer, William Gregson and 
William Halliday) and the Swallow and Achilles (both with Gregson, Thomas Dunbar, John Kennion, 
Peter Holme and John Bridge).49 Henry Hardwar therefore not only had larger than average mean 
network size in both trades, he also repeat invested with other well-known privateers and slave 
traders, and across those trades as well.  
James Gildart (centre bottom Figure 3, top left below the Fforde in Figure 4), had quite 
different average mean network sizes across the two trades; 7.0 for the ‘private men of war’ (all 
‘deep water’ voyages), and 4.79 for his slave trade investments. As was noted above, he repeat 
invested with Henry Hardwar on the Liverpoole and Liverpool voyages, although the two groups 
were not exactly the same. His other two voyages were the Mercury (1756 and 1757), both with 
Bartholomew Sherlock, Richard Trafford, Thomas Wakefield and John Hulton,  the latter three being 
leading privateer investors. Trafford and Wakefield also invested in the slave trade. Gildart’s mean 
slave trade trading network size is brought down by five voyages (out of a total of fourteen) in which 
he invested, unusually, with only one other person; the Upton’s two voyages and the Lawrell, with 
Abraham Barnes, and the Dove’s two voyages with Hugh Williams.50 In the remaining slave trade 
voyages, he invested with those with whom he had invested in privateering, such as Henry Hardwar, 
Sherlock Bartholomew and William Earle. On other voyages, he still invested with leading slave 
traders such as William Davenport. For the two voyages of the Forde, he repeat invested with Felix 
Doran, James Brown, Samuel Winstanley, Charles Ford (after whom the vessel was named?), William 
Hutton and Robert Green. James Gildart therefore repeat invested with trusted co-investors even 
                                                 
48 The African is at http://www.slavevoyages.org/, voyage 90569. 
49 It is possible that there is an error on the recording of the two King George voyages, as they also have the 
same tonnage and the same year. However, the destination and the outcome voyages are recorded 
differently, so they are recorded as separate voyages here as well. See http://www.slavevoyages.org/, voyages 
90594 and 90595. 
50 See http://www.slavevoyages.org/, voyages, 90772, 90773, 90857, 90822, 90823. There is the possibility 
that 90772 and 90773 are a double counting of voyages, but they have again been left as separate voyages as 
that is how they are recorded in the slave trade database. 
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when in a small group, and with other leading slave traders and privateers when in larger groups. 
We do not know the reason for this disparity, although it is worth noting that all the smaller 
investment group voyages were to Senegambia. Possibly Gildart perceived this destination as less 
risky.  
William Williamson (centre bottom Figure 3, centre top above the African in Figure 4) had 
the highest average mean network size on his ‘private men of war’ cruises (all ‘deep water’ ventures) 
of 7.67 and had an average mean size of above average on his slave trade voyages at 6.75. He was 
very well connected in the ‘deep water’ cruises as well. He linked the networks of the Liverpool and 
Liverpoole vessel(s), as well as the two Anson ventures, in addition to his links with those investing in 
the Grand Buck via Edmund Ogden. Via Henry Hardwar, he was also connected to the Auson voyage 
investors. If we look at his three ‘deep water’ investments in more detail, we can see that his two 
investments with the Anson were with the same people: George Campbell, Robert Hyde & Co., 
Thomas Rumbold, Henry Hardwar and Edmund Ogden. Henry Hardwar was also amongst the 
investors in Williamson’s third investment, the 300 ton Liverpoole. Although Williamson and 
Hardwar were the only investors in common in the Liverpoole and Anson, other leading players were 
in this group, such as James Gildart, and John Hulton.51 
What is noticeable in Williamson’s slave trade networks is the recurrence of certain actors 
who were interconnected with the privateering networks. For example, Henry Hardwar was one of 
five other investors in the two voyages of the Glory in 1757 and 1759. The other four investors, 
James Clemens, Lawrence Spencer, Thomas Wycliffe and Richard Powell also invested together in 
both voyages. Henry Hardwar was also one of the investors in the Baltimore (1760), as were William 
Earle and James Gildart. Williamson’s investment in the Betty (1761) did not have any cross over in 
investors with other slave trade voyages, or his investments in ‘deep water’ vessels, but that may be 
why that particular group was larger—eight actors—to further spread the risk. It is clear therefore 
that Williamson not only spread his risk with a rational number of actors, he also repeat invested 
with trusted other merchants in both ‘deep water’ voyages and the slave trade, and indeed, reduced 
his risk further by joining in with the same actors, or other well-known and experienced actors, 
across these trades as well. 
Edmund Ogden (centre left Figure 3, centre right below the Marquis of Granby in Figure 4), 
is one of the three investors whose mean network size in privateering was smaller than those of his 
slave trade networks, at 6.67 and 15 respectively. He invested in three ‘deep water’ vessels. One of 
these was the Grand Buck, in a group of eight. Interestingly, none of the other investors were 
                                                 
51 The other investors in the Liverpoole were: William Earle; Francis Gildart, Messrs Douglass & Blackwood; 
Thomas Wycliffe, Edmund Lyon, Jonathon Robinson; and William Hutchinson.  
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leading privateering investors, an anomaly amongst the other case studies, although one was a 
leading slave trader, John Knight.52 Perhaps the lack of detailed knowledge and experience accounts 
for the larger network size of the Grand Buck. Ogden’s other two investment groups were in the 
Anson (both voyages) along with leading privateers George Campbell, William Williamson and Henry 
Hardwar, noted above. He only invested in two slave trade voyages, both with the same investors 
for the two voyages of the Liberty. Perhaps he did not invest more because he thought the slave 
trade too risky; certainly the Liberty had one of the largest investment groups in the slave trade at 
fifteen investors. Leading slave traders were to be found amongst them, such as John and William 
Crosbie, but also leading privateering investors such as Richard Trafford, and Isaac Blackwood and 
Richardson Douglas, most likely Messrs Blackwood and Douglass who invested in the Liverpoole.53 
One anomaly is that John Knight, despite being an investor in the Grand Buck and a leading slaver, 
was not amongst Ogden’s slave trade investment groups. 
Thomas Wakefield’s (centre top Figure 3, centre left below the Isaac in Figure 4) networks in 
both trades are well above the average means. He invested in three ‘private men of war’, all ‘deep 
water’ cruises, the Isaac and the Mercury’s two voyages. In the first, none of the other leading 
privateer investors were present, although James Appleton, who invested in two ‘deep water’ 
vessels, was there. In the case of the Mercury, the other four investors were the same in both cases, 
Sherlock Bartholomew, Richard Trafford, James Gildart and John Hulton, all of whom invested in two 
or more ‘private men of war’. Wakefield only invested in one slave trade voyage during this period, 
the Isaac in 1758, with six other people. Three of them were also investors in the Isaac, in the 1756 
privateering voyage (possibly the same vessel as the tonnages are roughly the same): Richard 
Townsend, Isaac Oldham (no doubt after whom the vessel was named), and Thomas Seel. Therefore, 
Wakefield not only rationally spread his risk, he did so with merchants he presumably trusted across 
both trades.  
Richard Trafford’s (top left Figure 3, centre right and right of the Willy in Figure 4, in the 
dense networks below the Perfect) average network size for both ‘private men of war’ and the slave 
trade are both above the average at 5.67 and 6.65 respectively, but still smaller than those of most 
of the other case studies. He is also one of the two men that also invested in ‘channel’ privateering 
(along with George Campbell), in the Alice. However, this investment group, at seven investors was 
much larger than the mean of ‘channel’ privateers, although James Appleton stands out as the only 
                                                 
52 The others were Francis Mosley, Joseph Griffith, Thomas Wycliffe, John Coppell, Joseph Kitching and Robert 
Clay. 
53 The other investors in the Liberty were William Fforde (the captain), William Trafford, William Gardner, John 
Hutton, Thomas Staniforth, Matthew Fforde, Thomas Gildart, William Rankine, William Greaves and Robert 




other leading investor in ‘private men of war’. His brother William Trafford also invested in the 
Alice.54 It is noteworthy therefore that the mean network size for his ‘deep water’ investments, the 
Mercury and Mercury Privateer, were slightly smaller at five. However, all the other investors in this 
group were leading privateers; James Gildart, Sherlock Bartholomew, Thomas Wakefield and John 
Hulton (Gildart and Wakefield being case studies also). 
Trafford was by far the largest case study investor in the slave trade with 29 voyages, and 
only Thomas Rumbold had more slave trade investments (31) out of those privateers with two or 
more ‘private men of war’ investments. He was certainly not risk averse. He was an investor in the 
Liberty, with fifteen investors, noted above, with other ‘private men of war’ investors and leading 
slave traders. Many of those, such as John and William Crosbie, who invested in the Liberty were 
also co-investors in many other slave trading voyages. Trafford also co-invested with William 
Trafford, and leading slave trader William Davenport. William Rankine and William Dobb also co-
invested on several occasions. It is worth noting that on the five occasions when there were only 
four investors, the others were always John Crosbie, William Crosbie and William Trafford.55 Richard 
Trafford was therefore unusual in only having his brother as a cross-trade investor. However, he 
always spread his risk with plenty of other investors, and when he invested in slave trade voyages in 
a network size smaller than the average mean for the period, it was always with the same, trusted 
and well-known investors, thereby reducing risk.  
George Campbell (bottom left and as George Campbell & Co. top centre in Figure 3 and 
centre above the Willy in Figure 4) has the smallest mean networks in both ‘private men of war’ and 
the slave trade. In this way he potentially appears as the least rational. He was involved in three 
privateering voyages. The first was the Blakeney Privateer, which was a ‘channel’ cruise, and deemed 
less risky. Indeed, he was the sole owner of this vessel. However, if we remove this ‘channel’ venture 
and only look at his ‘deep water’ investments, the Anson, which had two voyages, his average 
network size was six, much more in line with rational risk-spreading behaviour. Figure 3 shows that 
he was relatively isolated in these investments, joined only to others through William Williamson 
and Henry Hardwar acting as bridges, who were both far better connected. However, both the 
Anson voyages had exactly the same investors. Furthermore, three of them were other leading 
privateers, Henry Hardwar, William Williamson and Edmund Ogden. Campbell therefore chose to 
stay with trusted and well-known actors, as did the other case study investors. 
He followed a very similar pattern in his slave trade investments, which helps to explain his 
relatively small mean network size in the slave trade (2.55). Indeed, Figure 4 shows him as even 
                                                 
54 My thanks to Dr Diana E. Ascott for confirming this relationship. 
55 http://www.slavevoyages.org/, see voyages 90720, 90781, 90825, 90715 and 90826. 
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more isolated, and in small investment groups, even though he invested in eleven slave trade 
voyages, of which for three, he was sole owner.56 For a fourth journey, he invested with three 
others, one being James (his brother?), Samuel Laben and Thomas Thompson. For the majority, 
however, he was in an investment group with two others. One of these was with William Moore and 
Hugh Mitchell. However, the remainder (six) were all with his father, George Campbell senior, and 
Stephen Hayes. Whilst George Campbell had smaller networks in both trades, he was rational in that 
he kept joint investments to family members and merchants well known to him in each trade, 
although unusually there were no linkages between those with whom he invested in privateering 
and the slave trade.  
 
Conclusion 
This article set out to explore whether Liverpool merchants perceived of privateering as a risky 
business; and, if so, whether they were essentially rational in investing in it. In doing so, it took 
network size as a proxy for the perceived level of risk. It compared network size in privateering with 
those of the slave trade at the same time. It is clear that all the Liverpool merchants who took out 
privateering licences for ‘letter of marque’ vessels acted rationally, but that this was mostly a default 
position in order to protect themselves, and any inadvertent profits, from the state. Against 
intuition, the network size for ‘letter of marque’ voyages overall were very much the same mean as 
for merchant partnerships in peacetime. It would appear therefore that either merchants did not 
perceive trade in wartime as noticeably more risky than in peace, or, and more likely, that these 
merchants simply retrenched their networks to those people considered the most trustworthy. 
However, the perceived level of risk for ‘private men of war’ cruises, both ‘channel’ and 
‘deep water’ was higher, and significantly so for the latter. Indeed, on average, the mean network 
size for ‘deep water’ voyages was higher than those in the slave trade at the same point in time, and, 
for some key actors, significantly higher. Looking at several case studies in detail has illuminated a 
more nuanced story. Investors in ‘channel’ privateering cruises were usually prepared to be in 
relatively small investment groups—and sometimes act as sole investor. Possibly this was due to the 
short-term and smaller financial capital nature of these ventures. However, they were far more likely 
to be part of a large network group when investing in ‘deep water’ cruises and slave trade voyages. 
What is interesting is the interconnections between the two trades. Perhaps all these men had a 
particular propensity to risk taking. However, even when there were no crossovers of exact 
                                                 
56 The voyage numbers were: 90528, 90637, 90638, 90502, 90719, 90751, 90779, 90752, 90780, 90845 and 
90846, at http://www.slavevoyages.org/.  
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investment groups, actors often worked with well-known actors in the other trade—presumably 
those who had a good reputation, access to information, and success rate.  
Apart from taverns and inns, these investors would have met and learned about each 
others’ reputations through some of the institutions of the town. For example, James Gildart (Mayor 
in 1750), Francis Gildart (Town Clerk), Richard Trafford (Bailiff in 1759), and George Campbell (Bailiff 
in 1756, Mayor in 1763), were all on the Town Council together from the 1750s. Henry Hardwar, 
James Gildart, Richard Gildart and William Williamson were all on the African Committee Trading 
from Liverpool (a slave trade association) in the 1750s and 1760s. Thomas Wakefield, William 
Boates, Nehemiah Holland, Thomas Parke and Matthew Fforde were all members of the Mock 
Corporation of Sephton (a drinking club), as were several members of the Earle Family. Francis 
Gildart, Joseph Manesty, William Boates and Isaac Blackwood were all members of the Ugly Face 
Club (another drinking club) in the 1740s and 1750s. They therefore met each other through both 
formal and informal channels, and learned to trust one another in a wider socio-economic 
environment.57 
We do not know the profitability of these voyages, and in any case, attempts to calculate an 
average mean would be pointless as a voyage might return with no prize, or one worth thousands of 
pounds. One has to assume, however, that repeat voyages meant that the first was profitable at 
least, or enough so to encourage a second or further voyage. Large incomes were occasionally made 
of course. The Isaac carried in a vessel to Kinsale bound for St. Domingo [St. Domingue?] with goods 
worth £6,000.58 George Campbell famously purchased his St. Domingo estate in Everton from profits 
earned taking prizes homeward bound from that island.59 The 1756 voyage of the Anson brought in a 
prize worth £20,000 for its owners.60 They were clearly feeling confident as the Anson was 
advertised later in 1756 as ‘Now ready to Cruize against the French’.61 In 1757, the King of Prussia 
took the snow La Favourite, invoiced at 30,000 livres and the Liverpool (1758) took a number of 
prizes and sent them to Liverpool, one alone being worth $50,000.62 The brigantine Jenny, part 
                                                 
57 See MIN COU I, Minutes of the Town Council; 352/MD1; Committee Book of the African Company of 
Merchants trading from Liverpool, 1750-1820; 027 LYC, Records of the Liverpool Lyceum Library, 367 SEF, 
Mock Corporation of Sephton; 367 UGL, Records Relating to Ye Ugly Face Club. For more on networking 
between these institutions, see Haggerty and Haggerty, ‘The Life Cycle’.  
58 Williams, Liverpool Privateers, 104. 
59 Williams, Liverpool Privateers, 92. For more on housing owned by elite (slave) merchants in Liverpool, see 
Jane Longmore, ‘Rural Retreats: Liverpool Slave Traders and their Country Houses’, in Madge Dresser and 
Andrew Hann (eds.) Slavery and the English Country House (Swindon: English Heritage, 2013), 30-45. 
60 Williams, Liverpool Privateers, 87, 95. 
61 Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser and Mercantile Register, 26 November 1756.  
62 Williams, Liverpool Privateers, 110-11, 132. 
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owned by Tarleton & Co., took the Le Gere in the Caribbean, with 120,000 cwt of sugar, amongst 
other commodities, worth a considerable amount of money.63 Of course, these are not profits as we 
do not know the charges against these incomes, but certainly huge profits could be made. Whilst 
larger network groups meant that they shared in those profits (and losses), they harnessed financial, 
human and social capital in doing so. These merchants may have justified to themselves and others 
that they were engaging in privateering as a patriotic duty in a time of war, and the analysis 
presented here demonstrates that they did perceive ‘deep water’ privateering as a particularly risky 
activity. However, through their use of their networks, through which they both spread risk, and 
brought wider financial and human capital, they were essentially rational in their pursuit of it.  
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Folio Vessel name Tons Burthen Commander 
HCA 26/10 37 Adventure (58) 200 Johnson, George 
HCA 26/6 32 Alice (80 tons) 80 Hayes, Daniel 
HCA 26/6 138 Anson (Dec 56) 140 Peers, Gorhsam 
HCA 26/5 42 Anson (Jun 56) 140 Fryer, Edward 
HCA 26/8 155 Antigua 90 Davis, John 
HCA 26/6 77 Aufon 200 Cuthbert, William 
HCA 26/5 130 Blakeney Privateer 90 Day, William 
HCA 25/48 29 Fame 150 Hall, Charles 
HCA 26/5 40 Fox 150 Paynter, David 
HCA 26/6 92 Grand Buck 300 Coppell, John 
HCA 26/5 94 Hawk 100 Syers, John 
HCA 26/6 94 Isaac 160 Chatworthy, David 
HCA 25/44 16 Jenny (170 tons) 170 Fazackerly, John 
HCA 26/6 111 King of Prussia (1756) 220 Makefie, William 
HCA 26/10 66 King of Prussia (1758) 240 Pearce, Thomas 
HCA 25/47 27 Liverpool 250 Ward, John 
HCA 26/7 133 Liverpoole 300 Hutchinson, William 
HCA 26/5 72 Manderin 40 Mackafee, William 
HCA 26/6 73 Mercury (1756) 120 Giles, John 
HCA 26/8 72 Mercury (1757) 150 Gachan, John 
HCA 26/5 75 Revenge 40 Giles, John 
HCA 26/9 29 Spy (240 tons) 240 Grimshaw, Robert 
HCA 26/5 44 St George 300 Wright, Fortunatus 
 
